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RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
‘ALL OF US ARE PRESIDENTS’: RADICAL DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
CHAPARE PROVINCE, BOLIVIA1 
 
THOMAS GRISAFFI 
London School of Economics 
 
Abstract: “All of us are presidents” examines the promise and 
disappointments of direct democracy that followed Evo Morales’ election 
as president of Bolivia. Working with the literature on politics, the state, 
and social movements in Latin America, the author contrasts ideas of 
normative democracy with radical democracy. The article pursues two 
ideas. First, in the wake of Morales’ election his core political base in the 
Chapare region perceived and engaged in politics as if they exercised 
direct, structural authority over the president’s policies. Second, while 
Morales initially embraced direct democracy he quickly distanced himself 
from this practice. As the coca growers observe, Morales abandon their 
political practices they have ceased to refer to themselves as presidents. 
Therefore, the author suggest that the model of direct democracy that 
Morales and his aides have promoted is in fact nothing more than a stark 
utopian claim designed to ensure the legitimacy of the MAS party. 
 
In December 2005 Evo Morales, an Indigenous Aymara and the leader of the 
Chapare coca growers union, won a landslide victory in Bolivia’s presidential 
election. The day before his official inauguration as president, Morales was 
honored with a ceremony of investiture at Tiwanaku, the ruins of an ancient 
Aymara temple located seventy kilometers from the capital city, La Paz.  
During the act, [Page 48 ]  Morales was dressed in a replica of a 1000-
year-old tunic worn by pre-Incan priests. He accepted a traditional staff of 
authority and the blessing from an Aymara Yatiri (ritual specialist). Standing in 
front of the Kalasasaya temple, Morales addressed tens of thousands of 
supporters. He explained that he would found the nation anew, but this time 
with and for the indigenous peoples. He told the crowd ‘…for the first time in 
Bolivian history, Aymaras, Quechuas, and Mojeños, we are presidents. Not 
only Evo is the president, all of us are presidents’ (Morales, 2006: 13, my 
translation). 
 The accession of Evo Morales to the presidency marks a watershed in 
Bolivian history. Until that point politics in this predominantly Indigenous 
                                                 
1
 All names have been changed, apart from those of public figures. 
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Andean country2 had been dominated by a small group of white-mestizos, 
and was widely regarded as a closed, prearranged system, operated for the 
benefit of elite groups (De Munter and Salman, 2009). In contrast Morales's 
Movement Towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo-MAS) led 
government appears to reflect a new pattern of relationships between state 
and society.   
 At the time of Evo’s inauguration I was conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork with the coca growers’ Unions in the Chapare, a tropical colonization 
zone located in the centre of Bolivia (also referred to as the Tropics of 
Cochabamba). In the months following the MAS victory, members of the Coca 
Unions (known as Cocaleros or coca growers) frequently echoed Evo’s 
words, they told me, ‘all of us are presidents here’, and ‘there are lots of Evos 
here’. At first I did not treat these claims with the kind of attention that they 
deserved. I thought that the people were telling me that the party they voted 
for had won. It was only later I came to realise that when they claimed to be 
presidents, they were not speaking figuratively, but rather, they were being 
deadly serious.  
The objective of this article is to describe what the coca growers meant 
when they declared that they were presidents and to assess the validity of this 
claim. In order to tackle this issue I pose two questions; what does democracy 
mean to the coca growers? And how does this understanding frame their 
perception of the Morales administration? Drawing on twenty months of 
ethnographic research3 I describe how the coca growers hold an entirely 
different conception of democracy to what David Nugent (2008) refers to as 
normative democracy. For the coca growers, democracy has nothing to do 
with competitive elections, individual liberties, universal suffrage, or the secret 
ballot. Rather the coca growers pursue a form of what Cohen and Fung 
(2004) have labelled radical democracy, in which all members of the 
community meet to debate, decide, and enact their laws. The fact that the 
coca growers practice a form of democracy, which clashes with the Western 
liberal ideal, is not in itself extraordinary, indeed the anthropological literature 
indicates that alternative expressions of democracy are actually quite 
                                                 
2
 In the 2001 census 62% of the population reported that they were indigenous (INE 2003).  
3
 This research was carried out over several visits to Bolivia between 2005 and 2011. 
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widespread (Rivera, 1990; Feuchtwang, 2003; Nash, 2007; Paley, 2008). 
What is unique about this case is that the coca growers’ political party has 
transformed into an organization responsible for building a government and 
therefore for ruling a country. 
 
[Page 49 ] 
 
In what follows I illustrate how the coca growers make no distinction 
between the movement and the party, rather they view the MAS as an 
extension of the Union organisation. As a result the Cocaleros consider that 
the style of politics found at the grassroots should also apply to the President 
and his aides. I argue that when the coca growers declared ‘we are all 
presidents’ they were saying that they, as members of the union organisation, 
now exercise direct, structural authority over the government’s policies. In 
other words they were staking a claim to a new form of citizenship, one, which 
is built on the perceived fusion of state, social movement and party.  
In the second part of the article I illustrate how precarious the claim to 
presidential citizenship actually is. While Morales initially embraced direct 
democracy, by continuing to serve as general secretary of the Coca 
Federations, he quickly distanced himself from these practices. It appears as 
if Morales has slipped into old fashion patronage politics, rewarding friends 
and punishing opponents.  As the coca growers observe Morales abandon 
their political practices they have ceased to refer to themselves as presidents. 
Therefore, I suggest that the model of direct democracy that Evo Morales and 
his political aides promote is in fact nothing more than a stark utopian claim, 
designed to ensure the legitimacy of the party.  
 
Disjunctive Democracy in Bolivia 
 
Bolivia entered the 21st century burdened by a grotesque ‘disjunctive 
democracy’ (Holston, 2006).  Since the return to civilian rule in 1982 formal 
democratic procedures have been in place, which allow all Bolivians to 
participate in the exercise of political power through voting. However the 
existence of unrepresentative and unresponsive parties has meant that many 
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ordinary people have historically felt as if their interests are not adequately 
represented in parliamentary debate (Assies and Salman, 2003; Mayorga, 
2005; Lazar, 2004). Beyond voting, other rights, which T.H. Marshall (1964) 
identified as essential for the full exercise of citizenship, have been either 
thinly distributed or else are non-existent. For example civil rights have been 
undermined by urban segregation, racism, corruption, weak rule of law and 
police violence (Gill, 2000; Goldstein, 2004). Meanwhile social rights have 
been eviscerated by twenty-five years of neoliberal economic policies, which 
have contributed to rising levels of inequality and undignified living conditions 
for many (Kohl and Farthing, 2006). 
  By 2000 Bolivia’s ‘disjunctive democracy’ had produced a serious 
crisis in the party system (Mainwaring et al., 2006; García Linera, 2006a). 
Over the following five years dissatisfaction with the government was 
expressed in frequent and intense protests, which resulted in the forced 
resignation of two presidents. The protestors represented a broad alliance 
including labour and peasant unions, students, indigenous organisations and 
neighbourhood associations. Along with calling for an end to neoliberal 
economic policies, the popular social forces were also involved in a battle 
over the meaning of citizenship and the forms of doing politics. Movement 
leaders classified actually existing democracy as a sham. They called [Page 
50 ] instead for a new model of governance built on indigenous traditions 
including subservient authorities, continuous deliberation and group rights as 
opposed to individual rights. The goal of the mobilizations that bought Morales 
to power then, was not to annul democracy (as critics of the MAS often claim), 
but rather to deepen and to extend it (García Linera et al., 2000/2007; Albro, 
2006) 
Academics have argued that the 2005 MAS victory marks the end of 
the liberal mestizo consensus (Hylton and Thomson, 2007; Dunkerley, 2007). 
In contrast to politicians from the ‘traditional ruling parties’, Morales emerged 
as the leader of an agricultural Federation in the Chapare and his leadership 
style reflects this heritage. On entering office President Morales set out to 
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reinvent the intuitions that had excluded indigenous peoples for centuries4 
(Postero, 2010). Morales invited a handful of social movement leaders to 
occupy important positions in his cabinet, he held regular popular 
consultations, and he frequently travelled all over the country to attend 
grassroots meetings. What is more while Morales is now the president of the 
nation he has nevertheless continued to act as the General Secretary of the 
Six Federations of Coca Growers in the Chapare. Reflecting on these changes 
Vice President Alvaro García Linera argues that the MAS represents a new 
form of government, one which is run by and for Bolivia’s social movements. 
He argues that through the MAS the social movements are now in direct 
control of the state apparatus (García Linera, 2006b: 25).  
Radical democratic movements have had to make the transition to 
governing elsewhere in Latin America. In Ecuador, with the election of Lucio 
Gutierrez in 2002, indigenous leaders who had been involved in the general 
strike and coup that removed Mahuad from office in 2000 were able to join the 
national government as cabinet ministers.  The indigenous movement then 
saw its moment of triumph fade away into accusations of corruption and 
patronage as they struggled to make the transition from outsiders to insiders 
(Zamosc, 2005).  Similar processes have been observed in Brazil, on its 
accession to power in 2003 the Brazilian Workers Party established a well-
differentiated political organization that worked autonomously from its social 
base (Rockefeller, 2007: 177-178).  In both cases the challenge these 
movements faced when they entered public office can be traced back to the 
different operating logics of movements and governing parties. Social 
movements are generally single issue, they are characterised by permanent 
mobilisation against named adversaries and they often disband once their 
goals have been met. Governing political parties meanwhile are supposed to 
be durable, representative of all citizens, and work towards the common good 
(Van Cott, 2008: 95-97). 
Today the MAS party is an alternative voice, but it is not as fully 
representative as it could be when it only stood for the coca growers. Morales 
                                                 
4
 Morales followed through with his campaign promise to set up an assembly to re-write the 
constitution. Delegates included sectors of the population that were left out of previous processes of 
institution building such as indigenous peasants and workers.  
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had to make alliances with diverse sectors (even those once considered to be 
enemies) and he toned down his radical rhetoric. Further, given the lack of 
expertise in the social movement ranks, most people who hold key positions 
in Evo’s cabinet are not indigenous leaders at all, but rather have urban 
middle class backgrounds and only joined MAS during the campaign. Finally 
the MAS has had to function within a pre-existing liberal political system which 
imposes restraints on how and when [Page 51 ] popular sovereignty can be 
exercised, thus restricting the possibilities for radical democratic practice 
(Rockefeller, 2007: 165).  
Observers have pointed out that as a result of the pressure to form a 
government the MAS has increasingly disengaged from the social movements 
to which it was once aligned.  In effect the bottom up mobilization is giving 
way to top down control (Mayorga, 2009; Gamarra, 2007; Zegada et al., 2008; 
Laserna, 2010).  The ethnographic detail outlined here contradicts the claim 
made by MAS leaders that the party is subsumed to the movement. On the 
contrary, I argue that the party is gradually severing the ties with its’ social 
base, challenging the coca growers self image as ‘presidents’.  
 
The Chapare Coca Growers 
 
The roots of the MAS party lie in the agricultural federations of the Chapare. 
The majority of the Chapare population is composed of Quechua speaking 
peasants from the Cochabamba valleys but there are also many Aymaras and 
Quechuas from the highland departments of Oruro, Potosi and La Paz.   
Migration to the region began in the mid-1950s when the National 
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) government promoted the directed 
colonisation of the tropical lowlands as a way to ameliorate the social 
problems that persisted after the national revolution. The majority of the 
migrants avoided getting involved with government programs but they did take 
advantage of the penetration roads and spontaneously settled the land. The 
migrants established an agricultural system characterised by small family run 
farms using manual labour. They cultivated coca leaf along with other crops 
including rice, bananas, yucca and citrus fruit for their own consumption and 
to sell on the market (Flores and Blanes, 1984). 
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 The Chapare settlers drew on their experience of agricultural 
syndicalism in the highlands and organized themselves into self-governing 
units known as sindicatos, which soon came to represent the maximum 
expression of community based organizing in the region. Given the virtual 
absence of the state it was the sindicatos, which assumed the role of local 
governance and exercised many state like powers. To this day the Chapare 
sindicatos are responsible for the allocation of land in parcels of ten to twenty 
hectares, collecting taxes from the coca trade, organising collective work 
parties, resolving disputes, setting transport fares and investing in public 
works (Healy, 1991: 89) 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the pace of migration to the tropical 
lowlands remained low and there were high rates of abandonment.  However 
this all changed in the late 1970s when the Chapare became the center of 
Bolivia’s illegal cocaine trade.  Over the following decade tens of thousands of 
ex-miners, factory workers and highland peasants flooded into the Chapare in 
response to the new economic opportunities presented by the cocaine 
economy. The new settlers dedicated themselves to planting coca leaf, 
processing cocaine paste and in jobs related to servicing the coca-cocaine 
industry. The colonizers still recount fantastic tales of the boom years when 
money was easy to come by and the Chapare was the place to go.  [Page 52 
] One ex-miner told me ‘the peasants used to wipe their ass with dollar bills; 
they thought that the money would never stop!’  
 However, the good times in this ‘get rich quick’ zone did not last for long. 
In 1988 the Bolivian congress passed anti-drug Law 1008, which classified all 
coca in the Chapare as illegal and slated it for eradication. Throughout the 
1990s U.S. trained and funded security forces were deployed in the region to 
forcibly uproot coca crops. Between 1997 and 2002 the Banzer administration 
ratcheted up the War on Drugs by implementing a no-holds barred 
accelerated eradication policy, known as the Dignity Plan (Plan Dignidad).  
Plan Dignidad resulted in the killing and wounding of dozens of peasant coca 
growers and the incarceration of many union leaders on charges of ‘narco-
terrorism’ (Ledebur, 2005).   
 One of the main pillars of Plan Dignidad was to provide families effected 
by eradication with alternative sources of income, however, crop substitution 
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projects never had much success at providing realistic alternative livelihoods 
(Farthing and Kohl, 2010: 201-203).  The Chapare peasants’ rely on coca 
because it represents a miracle crop. Coca grows like a weed, is light and 
easy to transport, generates far higher returns per hectare than any other 
crop, and most importantly there is always a guaranteed market for it. The 
same cannot be said about citrus fruit, pineapple, palm-heart or any of the 
other cash crops promoted by European and North American development 
agencies (Spedding, 2004).   
 Given its economic importance the coca growers fought to maintain the 
right to grow coca in the Chapare. The defence of coca gave the Chapare 
peasants a common cause, enemies were easy to define, including anybody 
who tried to prevent them from making a living with coca, be it the 
government, the military or the US embassy. The overarching ideology was 
that growing coca was good and not growing coca was bad. Coca was not 
just a crop that peasants grew but also a way of life that reflected the moral 
worth of the cultivator (Grisaffi, 2010).  
 In spite of (or some might say because of) military repression, the coca 
growers built a powerful agricultural union to contest the government’s anti-
coca policy. The Sindicatos coalesced into peasant Centrals, which in turn 
formed Federations. Today the 45,000-coca grower families are organised 
into Six Federations, which in turn are organizationally linked together by the 
Six Federations Co-ordination Committee5. In 1995 the Coca Union 
established its own political party, which eventually ran under the banner of 
the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).  In 2005 the MAS won the 
presidential election, making Chapare Coca Union leader, Evo Morales, 
Bolivia’s first indigenous head of state.  
 
Vida Organica  
 
During fieldwork I lived in a small village called Estrella.  Estrella is the home 
to about fifty families. With the exception of three families who are dedicated 
                                                 
5
 The coca growers federations are affiliated to national peasant union organizations including the 
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Confederación 
Sindical de Colinazadores de Bolivia (CSCB) and the Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de 
Bolivia - ‘Bartolina Sisa’ (FNMC-BS). 
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to trade, all households in the village are members of the sindicato. Only 
people already known to the community are allowed to join the sindicato, and 
even then, [Page 53  ] only once they have proven their commitment by 
participating in communal work parties and attending meetings.  The 
consequence of this exclusive selection procedure is that today the sindicato 
is cross cut by kinship relations, longstanding friendships, and alliances 
between families, expressed as compadrazgo (god-parenthood). The depth of 
commitment to the sindicato is reflected in the fact that the residents of 
Estrella would often describe it as being a bit like an extended family. 
The sindicato holds it’s meeting on the first Friday of every month. The 
assembly takes place in a barn on the outskirts of the village.  At least one 
member from each affiliated household (including men and women) is 
expected to attend the monthly meeting and participate in what the coca 
growers refer to as vida organica (the organic life of the organisation).  
Absentees incur a significant fine, while persistent malingerers run the risk of 
facing sterner sanctions such as being prevented from growing coca or even 
having their land confiscated. In order to verify that all affiliates are present a 
register is called at the beginning and at the end of each meeting.  If the 
meeting turns out to be particularly long then the General Secretary is likely to 
call for the door to be locked. This is done to ensure that nobody leaves half 
way through. The concern with attendance reflects the coca growers’ belief 
that resolutions are only valid if the decision has been made through the direct 
participation of all members of the community.   
 At the meeting the men sit on benches to one side of the room and the 
women sit on the floor opposite. Members of the executive committee, 
including the General Secretary, Treasurer and Sub–Secretaries, sit in front of 
a chalkboard at the far end of the barn. The meeting begins with a reading of 
the minutes of the previous month followed by reports from the various 
Secretaries who head up diverse commissions including, justice, land, health, 
coca, education, and so on. At any point during the meeting members can ask 
for ‘la palabra’ (the word) and speak for as long as they wish. Interlocutors 
speak in a mixture of Spanish and Quechua. They normally begin by 
introducing themselves and affirming the positions of all previous speakers on 
a similar topic, often repeating earlier arguments verbatim. The aim of this 
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discursive style is to emphasise respect for others and also to build 
consensus. Building consensus takes a long time; meetings last for a 
minimum of six hours but occasionally drag on into the night. If a decision 
cannot be reached then the topic will be returned to at a following meeting.  
During the intervening period issues of public importance are discussed within 
the family and in public spaces such as at markets, restaurants and bars. 
Generally by the time the next meeting comes around, the dispute has been 
settled and consensus achieved.  
When it comes to making a decision the coca growers do not hold a 
secret ballot, rather they have a public demonstration of support. The 
methods employed by the sindicato include raised hands or the Fila system. 
The latter requires sindicato members to line up in a file behind their chosen 
candidate. The candidate with the longest line wins. The reasons why the 
coca growers prefer public voting systems to private ones are twofold. First, it 
prevents fraud as everyone can bear witness to the process. Second, public 
voting makes people accountable for the [Page 54 ] decisions that they 
make. This second point reflects the coca growers’ overriding concern that 
decisions should be sovereign.  
Reaching consensus is undoubtedly an objective of the coca growers’ 
assembly culture however I do not want to overstate the matter. In private 
some coca growers explained that the reason the Sindicato appears to think 
with one mind is a result of what they referred to as ‘enforced conformity’. 
Some of my informants worried that if they did not conform to the status quo 
then they risked facing sanctions.  What is more, while interactions are 
overwhelmingly characterized by an ethic of respect, not all members 
participate equally in debate. Many people, particularly women, avoided 
speaking out at Sindicato meetings. This can be accounted for by the fact that 
sexist attitudes in the Sindicato mean that the views of women are not 
accorded the same weight as those of men. On several occasions I witnessed 
women being ignored and even jeered at when they addressed Sindicato 
meetings. Women were not the only people who were marginalized during 
debate. Other people who tended to say very little included Aymara men who 
were not confident speakers of either Spanish or Quechua, and people who 
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did not own land but attended meetings on behalf of the landowner (this 
includes partidarias, share-croppers, and peons, farm laborers).  
In sum the coca growers pursue a form of radical democracy, which 
looks more like the civic republicanism associated with the ancient Greeks 
than a variant of modern liberal democracy (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 
361). However, despite the emphasis on participation, Sindicato politics 
should not be thought of as a public sphere in the Habermasian (1989) sense 
of the term, whereby participation is equal and reason triumphs over power in 
the elaboration of ‘public opinion’. Rather just like in the Greek polis, it is male 
property owners who appear to have a full say in the administration of public 
affairs. Further, there is a drive towards conformity and anyone who 
challenges the status quo can be intimidated with sanctions.  
 
Sindicato Leadership 
 
Elections for Sindicato leadership positions are held annually while Central 
and Federation level leadership posts are put to the vote once every two 
years. There is no limit on the number of times an individual can hold a post. 
Leadership positions are graded, from low level offices such as the secretary 
of sports right up to ‘Dirigente’ (General Secretary of a Sindicato). A Dirigente 
who has proven his worth can then climb the ladder to become a leader of a 
Central, Federation or even the executive committee of the Six Federations. A 
leadership role is generally considered to be an onerous responsibility, which 
involves a lot of hard work for no pay. However Dirigentes gain intellectual 
and organizational skills and as a result they command a high level of respect 
within the community. Most Dirigentes assume an advisory role once their 
tenure has expired.  
All members of the Sindicato are required to serve their community at 
least once by taking on a leadership role. It is not always an individual’s 
choice to become [Page 55 ]  a leader, rather the community can ‘name’ 
someone and it is very difficult to turn down a nomination. Quite apart from 
losing face, if a person is named for a post and turns it down, they incur a fine 
of one hundred Bolivianos.  When the Chapare was militarized in the 1990s 
and early 2000s people were reluctant to assume leadership positions 
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because being a leader meant putting oneself in harm’s way. In those days 
Dirigentes were expected to be at the front of the marches and to man road 
blockades. Leaders were often hunted down and arrested by the militarized 
police on suspicion of ‘narco-terrorism’. Today being a leader is a far more 
attractive role. Now the MAS is in government many young people see 
Sindicato leadership positions as a path to getting a government job (although 
they rarely succeed in this).   
One of the most important elements of Sindicato democracy is the 
emphasis that the bases put on the social control of their leaders. Social 
control refers to the fact that all Sindicato members have the power and 
indeed the responsibility to hold their leaders directly accountable. If a 
Dirigente is deemed to be acting inappropriately, then the bases have the 
right to impose a punishment or even force them out of office. So for example, 
the leader of Sindicato Estrella was replaced before the end of his term 
because people thought he drank too much and was setting a bad example. I 
heard of Dirigentes in other communities facing sanctions for the 
embezzlement of funds, the corrupt allocation of land, and for not adequately 
following the will of the bases. The overriding principle is that leaders enact 
the decisions made by the bases –they follow they do not lead.  
 This form of ‘social control’ informs the organization of the entire Coca 
Union. As a result, despite the hierarchical structure of the Six Federations, 
the location of the decision-making power resides with the Sindicato 
members. In theory it is they who deliberate, come up with proposals, which 
then rise through the tiers to the executive committee.  Here the proposals are 
clarified and turned into policy, they then filter back down again to be either 
approved or rejected by the Sindicato members. The close links and 
accountability between the leadership and the bases means that people 
understand the resolutions made by the Six Federations Committee to be a 
direct result of their commitment to attending local level meetings.  The 
Cocaleros have a very strong identification with the goals of the Six 
Federations as a whole.  
 
The Sindicatos, MAS, and Municipal Government 
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In 1994 the MNR government of Gonalzo Sanchez de Lozada implemented 
the Law of Popular Participation and decentralization. The Popular 
Participation law formalized the election and structure of municipal 
government bodies, legalised grassroots civil society organizations and 
decentralized twenty per cent of national revenues to municipal 
governments6. The outcome of popular participation and decentralization has 
been mixed. Academics have noted that in some regions the reforms 
entrenched long-standing inequalities as mestizo-elites came to dominate 
municipal politics. However, the picture is quite different in regions such as 
the [Page 56 ] Chapare, where there are well-organized indigenous-
peasant based movements (Albó, 2002; Kohl, 2003).  
 The Chapare coca growers seized the opportunity to participate in local 
elections and in 1995 the Coca Federations set up their own electoral vehicle, 
which later ran under the registered title of the Movimiento Al Socialismo 
(MAS). The coca growers’ party had astounding electoral success and by 
1997 it controlled most of the town halls in the Cochabamba Tropics.  Given 
that the party was forged in the Chapare it should come as no surprise that 
the MAS was modelled on the same democratic principles as those found in 
the Sindicatos.  In order to consider the nature of the relationship between the 
Coca Federation and its political party I now take a closer look at municipal 
government in the region.   
 In the Chapare there is a total overlap between membership of the Union 
and membership of the MAS party and this has a profound impact on the way 
municipal politics works in the region. The Coca Union chooses candidates 
from within its ranks to stand as mayors or councillors.  The candidate is 
generally a person who already has significant leadership experience within 
the Coca Federations. So for example Don Lorenzo was a councilor at the 
time I carried out fieldwork. He explained to me that he had been a Dirigente 
of a Peasant Central and was selected to stand for public office at a Coca 
Federation meeting. He told me that he then still had to win the position by 
participating in the municipal election, which he referred to as the ‘segunda 
                                                 
6
 Some academics have been critical of such non-market programs which they maintain are simply the 
most recent elements of a neo-liberal governing project with the intention to accommodate specific 
demands and thereby divert attention away from national policy (see Peck and Tickell 2002).  
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elección’ (second election). As far as Don Lorenzo was concerned the 
segunda elección was more of a formality than a serious competition. This is 
because the Coca Federations have so many votes at their disposal that the 
candidate they endorse will inevitably win.  
 Despite the voting power of the Federations, the coca growers are not 
complacent.  It is common for the Sindicatos to hold a practice vote before an 
election. At the monthly meeting mock ballot papers are circulated and 
members are required to cast their vote under conditions similar to those at 
the polling booth. Once this task has been completed the sindicato leader will 
then go through each ballot in turn to explain if it has been filled in correctly. A 
correct vote is a legible vote, but more importantly it is a vote for the MAS 
candidate. Practice voting is deemed necessary because many coca growers 
are illiterate and so leaders fear that members might accidentally vote for the 
wrong party. Unsurprisingly in the 2010 mayoral election in Villa Tunari (a 
town in the centre of the Chapare) the MAS candidate received one hundred 
per cent of the vote7. 
 Once in office the role of the Mayor and the Councilors is to carry out 
directives that come directly from the Coca Federations. The degree of control 
exerted over public officials is reflected in the fact that they are expected to 
provide regular oral reports on the progress of their administration and they 
even have to pay a percentage of their salary to the Federations. In the 
Chapare, the Town Halls double up as meeting places for the Coca 
Federations.  This means that Sindicato affiliates are in constant contact with 
the Mayor and Councilors and can easily exert social control. If the bases 
detect misconduct or contempt for Sindicato authority, then they have the 
power to sanction their leaders. This could take the form of a fine, [Page 57 
] public humiliation, removal from office, or even the use of violent force 
including whipping (Van Cott, 2008: 195).  
 As a result of coca grower hegemony in the Chapare the Federations 
have been able to impose their own forms of decision-making onto Municipal 
Government. This can be viewed as a positive development as previously 
marginalized people are now in power and they are using municipal funds to 
                                                 
7
 http://www.cne.org.bo/CNEResultados/ProcesoElectoral2010.htm 
Grisaffi, T. (2013) '‘All of us are Presidents': Radical Democracy and Citizenship in the Chapare Province, Bolivia'. 
Critique of Anthropology, 33:1, 47-65. http://coa.sagepub.com/content/33/1/47.abstract 
 
    15 
invest in neglected rural areas. However people who are not aligned with the 
Coca Federations, including small business owners in the towns (in particular 
the hotel owners), and lowland indigenous groups, complain that they are 
excluded from access to municipal resources.  What is more, even public 
officials (who represent the MAS) point out that there is a clash between the 
community-based forms of governance and the national laws that regulate 
municipal governments. For example Don Lorenzo complained that the bases 
do not understand that the work of a public official is quite different to that of a 
Sindicato leader.  Don Lorenzo told me that the bases often demand that 
public officials disregard existing laws or else invent new ones in order to 
achieve Federation goals.  
The point I want to make is that when it comes to municipal politics in 
the Chapare the boundaries between state and society are absolutely blurred 
(Guimarães, 2009). I argue that when Morales won the 2005 election the coca 
growers imagined that the national government would function in a similar 
way to local government, in other words, the Cocaleros thought of the 
government officials as nothing more than spokespeople for decisions forged 
at their Union meetings. 
 
From Grassroots Mobilization to Top Down Control  
 
The MAS victory in the 2005 Presidential elections brought into question long 
established modes of imagining the state. For the coca growers the state went 
from being something that was thought of as sitting above society (Ferguson 
and Gupta, 2002), negligent or worse still an enemy, to something that they 
could now reach and even control. The shift in political subjectivity is best 
demonstrated by the fact that immediately following the election many coca 
growers claimed that they too were presidents.  
Of all the social sectors in Bolivia, President Morales has paid most 
attention to the concerns of his powerbase located in the Chapare. During the 
period that I carried out fieldwork Morales came to the Chapare on average 
once every four weeks to attend Federation meetings, sports events and 
parties. On these occasions Morales always began his speeches by 
reminding the bases that while he might be the President of the Republic he is 
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nevertheless still the General Secretary of the Coca Federations and he 
demanded that they should treat him as such. Morales would invite the bases 
to exert social control, using phrases such as ‘tell me when I make a mistake’, 
‘please guide me’ and ‘this is not the government of Evo Morales alone, this is 
our government’.   
[Page 58 ]  
To give his inclusive rhetoric a bit of substance Evo Morales invited the 
Chapare Federations to nominate the country’s new drugs Czar, otherwise 
known as the ‘Viceministro de Coca y Desarrollo Integral’. The members of 
the Six Federations took this task very seriously and after an extended 
consultation with the bases they put forward the aptly named Oscar Coca 
(who had previously worked as an advisor to the movement). Shortly 
afterwards at a rally held in the Chapare President Morales announced that a 
close personal friend of his would fill the position, not Oscar Coca, but ex-
Chapare mayor, Felipe Cáceres. Evo’s disregard for the decision of the bases 
angered some local Federation leaders. One Dirigente commented ‘Que 
Macana! Evo hasn’t respected our decision; the power has gone to his head!’  
 Radio Soberanía is the coca growers’ radio station. It is owned, 
managed, staffed, and financed by members of Federation Tropico (the 
largest and most militant of the coca growers’ Federations). Most people who 
are members of Federation Trópico tune into Radio Soberanía. This is 
because it puts out the strongest FM signal in the region, but also, as the 
colonizers frequently told me, ‘its ours’ ‘we paid for it’, what is more they 
simply don’t trust any other source of information.   
 The principals that inform vida organica also underlie radio production. 
Everyone who worked at the station insisted that the radio broadcast should 
represent the consensus arrived at by the population. One of the reporters 
explained to me ‘…the doors are always open. The policy is to give la palabra’ 
to everyone, no? … It (the radio) is the voice of the Cocaleros. I would say 
that it is the voice of the people’.  
 In the wake of Evo’s decision not to appoint the coca growers preferred 
choice of Oscar Coca, the director of Radio Soberanía aired the complaints 
on his daily news program. Live on air Don Edmundo (the director) called on 
Evo Morales to return to the Chapare in order to explain himself at an 
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assembly of the Coca Federations. Edmundo also criticised Evo for continuing 
in his role as General Secretary of the Six Federations. Given that Radio 
Soberanía is owned and operated by the Federation, Edmundo’s call on Evo 
to respond to the bases was entirely legitimate; it represented a form of social 
control.  
 A few days after the broadcast Edmundo received a phone call 
instructing him to attend a meeting at the Presidential Palace. When 
Edmundo eventually got back from La Paz he acted out word for word what 
happened in his meeting with the President. In a taped interview Edmundo 
told me, ‘Evo said to me, “here in the radio you can’t say anything against the 
government …and certainly nothing against me. You are only going to talk 
well about this government”. In response Edmundo told the President that he 
was not a PR man but a journalist and had a commitment to the bases.  
A few weeks later an extraordinary general meeting of Federation 
Tropico was called to discuss the future of the Radio station. The assembly 
was presided over by Don Julio, the general secretary of Federation Tropico 
and the departmental representative for MAS. Julio forwarded the motion that 
the Federation should sack [Page 59 ] Edmundo on the grounds that he 
was incompetent. This was clearly not the case as most people enjoyed 
Edmundo’s programs and believed that he operated the radio for the benefit 
of the rank and file. Nevertheless, during the meeting nobody stood up for 
Edmundo. There are several reasons why this might be. It was clear that 
Edmundo’s dismissal was a decision that had come directly from Evo 
Morales, and people were reluctant to contradict him. What is more, Julio 
implied that if the bases accepted Evo’s personal choice for a replacement 
director, then the government might be able to find some funds to go towards 
setting up a television channel for the Federation (a project that had long been 
in the pipeline). After two hours the matter was settled, Edmundo was fired. 
The following day during his final broadcast on Radio Soberanía Edmundo 
classified his dismissal as ‘an attack against the right to free speech’.  
Soon after Edmundo’s departure President Morales visited the radio 
station to celebrate carnival. Travelling with the President in his white four by 
four was Rodrigo, the new director of Radio Soberanía. Rodrigo is an 
experienced broadcaster who was trained at the tin miners´ stations and later 
Grisaffi, T. (2013) '‘All of us are Presidents': Radical Democracy and Citizenship in the Chapare Province, Bolivia'. 
Critique of Anthropology, 33:1, 47-65. http://coa.sagepub.com/content/33/1/47.abstract 
 
    18 
worked at NGOs in the city of Cochabamba. Despite Rodrigo’s considerable 
broadcasting experience he nevertheless represented an odd choice for the 
position.  Rodrigo was an outsider, nobody in the Chapare knew him, but 
more importantly, the Federation had played no part in selecting him (apart 
from to rubber stamp Evo’s personal decision). It soon became clear why Evo 
had made Rodrigo his new director, while drunk at a party Rodrigo flung an 
arm around my shoulders and drawled ‘do you know why the President chose 
me?  …He trusts me’. 
 Radio Soberanía had always been run on a shoestring budget, 
however within three months of Rodrigo’s arrival, the station underwent a 
rapid modernisation, including the installation of a satellite link for the Internet, 
a brand new FM transmitter, computers, and studio equipment8. The money 
presumably came from the government, although Rodrigo always denied this. 
The reporters could now call on local government agencies for favours, 
including lifts in their pickup trucks and the loan of equipment for special 
events. These benefits came at a price however, Rodrigo let the radio team 
know that the demands of politicians must now take precedence over the 
concerns of the bases (Grisaffi, 2009: 229-231).  
Two ideas about vida organica emerge from the ethnographic detail 
outlined above. The first comes from Edmundo who sees the Federation 
owned radio station as a space for local actors free from extraneous control. 
As far as Edmundo is concerned radio should be independent and operated 
to oversee the MAS leadership. This position sits well with the coca growers’ 
ideals of assembly culture, which privileges the ‘social control’ of authorities 
and the idea that the party should be subservient to the movement.  The 
second view, represented by Evo Morales, suggests that the radio should 
serve the party’s interests. Evo Morales evidently has no time for critical 
voices from within the ranks. This is clearly illustrated by Evo’s attempt to 
brand Edmundo as a traitor when he stood up for the interests of the bases. 
Morales has taken control of the Federation owned radio station and has 
effectively turned it into a government propaganda machine.  
 
                                                 
8
 In 2010 the Federation installed a television channel at Radio Soberanía 
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[Page 60 ] 
 Coca, Radical Democracy and Changing Subjectivities 
 
Prior to January 2006 (when Evo entered into office) the staff at Radio 
Soberanía never had to worry about a confrontation between the party and 
movement because, as we have seen, the two were essentially the same 
thing.   In the past people made criticisms about the way the MAS was run but 
they would do so in private, there was overwhelming public support for the 
party. In contrast today tensions over the steerage of the party are beginning 
to emerge and these are being aired in public. The contradiction between the 
goals of the bases on the one hand and MAS party goals on the other is most 
acutely felt in relation to coca.  In this final section I outline grassroots 
assessments of Evo’s deviation from direct politics though a discussion of 
coca policy.  
On entering office President Morales made a radical break with the 
previous strategy of forced coca eradication.  Evo’s alternative policy, initially 
developed in collaboration with the Coca Unions, envisions development with 
coca and turns the coca growers into partners in the fight against drug 
trafficking. Under the new regime each coca union member is permitted to 
grow a limited amount of coca, known as a cato (one third of an acre) and the 
responsibility for ensuring compliance has been transferred from the security 
forces to the Coca Federations9. The coca growers consider that the new 
policy is a step in the right direction, the violence provoked by forced coca 
eradication is seen as a thing of the past and the Cocaleros have been able to 
re-establish themselves after years of impoverishment.  However restrictions 
on the amount of coca that can be grown, coupled with eradication efforts, 
and what is seen in the Chapare as the government’s softer approach 
towards other coca producing regions, has caused sections of the rank and 
file to complain of betrayal.  
Rather than directly challenge the government over its policy10 some 
Cocaleros subvert the new regime by simply growing more coca than the ‘one 
                                                 
9
 The new policy is referred to as ‘social control’ and draws on Indigenous forms of self-governance.  
10
 On the 9th May 2012 there was a clash between a group of Chapare coca growers and members of 
the Joint Task Force who were conducting coca eradication. 
Grisaffi, T. (2013) '‘All of us are Presidents': Radical Democracy and Citizenship in the Chapare Province, Bolivia'. 
Critique of Anthropology, 33:1, 47-65. http://coa.sagepub.com/content/33/1/47.abstract 
 
    20 
cato’ limit allows. They do this by subdividing their plots and registering the 
parcels of land under the names of different family members (who each have 
the right to a cato of coca) or else they plant extensions of coca deep in the 
jungle, far from prying eyes. The coca growers justify their actions by pointing 
out that a cato only generates marginally more money than the national 
minimum wage, and they claim that this is simply not enough to live on.  What 
is more the coca growers argue that President Morales has done very little to 
open up markets for alternative tropical crops, leaving them with no option but 
to grow more coca 
Against this background Radio Soberanía has been used to promote 
the new coca policy. The media producers do this by praising Sindicatos that 
have successfully maintained one cato per affiliate and naming and shaming 
those that have not. The reporters portray the policy as the will of the 
Federations and remind the rank and file of the dangers of not respecting the 
coca regime. As a result when the coca growers listen to the radio, they often 
find that there is a gap between the ideological self-image of the Union that is 
broadcast and the issues that they see as being important in their day-to-day 
lives. Many times I was sat with coca growers listening to the radio when the 
broadcast urged the rank and file to grow less coca leaf or to attend a march 
in support of a government policy that bore little [Page 61 ] relevance to 
them. On these occasions the listeners would react by questioning the validity 
of government policy and criticizing Federation and MAS leaders for rushing 
through proposals without adequately consulting the bases.  In order to 
maintain their listenership the media producers at Radio Soberanía 
rhetorically position the station outside of the state. On air they claim that 
Radio Soberanía represents the unmediated ‘voice of the Cocaleros’ and off 
air they insist that the station maintains a critical distance from government 
(see Grisaffi, 2009: 217).  
In the Chapare people are acutely aware that Morales has abandoned 
their political practice. Union members complain that they can no longer get 
close to Evo Morales when he visits the Chapare, and established leaders 
lament that Morales has no time to listen to their proposals. As the links 
between the movement and party ossify, so the coca growers have given up 
referring to themselves as ‘presidents’. Nevertheless, the rank and file 
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continue to hold Morales in high regard. If Morales makes a mistake or is not 
radical enough, then it is widely assumed that this is the fault of his aides, who 
the Cocaleros characterise as ‘opportunists’ with no commitment to the goals 
and values of the MAS party. I frequently heard Union leaders discuss the 
possibility of bringing parliamentarians to the Chapare where they could be 
disciplined, just as a union leader would if they failed to follow the will of the 
rank and file.  
Most Cocaleros continue to support the MAS administration, principally 
because they are concerned that any other government would reinitiate forced 
coca eradication.  However, not all coca growers are so sanguine, some have 
held onto their radical sense of democracy and are looking for alternatives to 
Morales and standard electoral politics. A handful of Sindicatos (those located 
in areas where coca eradication is being enforced) have threatened to split 
away from the Six Federations with the aim to establish their own alternative 
organization to challenge the MAS (see Grisaffi, 2009; 127-128).  
 
Conclusion  
 
I set out to understand what the coca growers meant when they declared ‘all 
of us are presidents’. To this end I posed two questions, what does 
democracy mean to the coca growers? And, how does this frame their 
understanding of the MAS administration? In response to these questions I 
have illustrated that for the coca growers full membership of a political 
community is dependent upon the exercise of political rights that far exceed 
the right to vote. We have seen that the coca growers put an intrinsic value on 
political participation, which they describe as a moral duty that everyone must 
fulfil. Their assembly culture prioritises personal relationships, consensus 
building, and the direct accountability of leaders to their community. I argue 
that this form of assembly culture has shaped the way that the coca growers 
perceive the MAS administration. I suggest that following the MAS victory in 
the 2005 presidential election the coca growers imagined that the kind of 
politics found at the grassroots would now extend right up to government. 
When the coca growers claimed to be Presidents then, they might as well 
have been stating [Page 62 ] ‘now we are citizens’ because they imagined 
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that they had finally gained the kind of political rights that they deem 
necessary for full membership in a political community.  
However, I have also shown that there are limits to this emerging form 
of ‘presidential citizenship’. The MAS government undoubtedly challenges 
taken for granted ideas about what democracy means, and how it can be 
practiced. Having said that, Garica Linera’s utopian claim that the MAS 
administration represents ‘a government of social movements’, does seem to 
be an exaggeration. The ethnographic evidence outlined above clearly 
illustrates that there is a discrepancy between the self-image of the MAS and 
political reality on the ground. It appears as if Evo Morales is attempting to 
sidestep the constraints imposed by direct democracy while simultaneously 
trying to tighten his grip on the movement. However, as we have seen, this 
strategy is not altogether successful, the bases remain cynical about the 
state, even when they vote for the government and can see it as aligned with 
their interests. This raises important questions about Morales’s hegemony on 
many fronts, but perhaps the most important issue is a popular desire to 
maintain spaces of political independence in the Chapare.  
The findings presented in this article are significant because the 2009 
constitution makes room for new and diverse forms of democracy and 
belonging, based on the kind of communitarian democracy described here.  
This article raises questions for the future of the new constitution such as: will 
the MAS be able to incorporate the desire for direct democracy? Or will those 
people schooled in alternative democratic systems always feel as if they are 
not full rights bearing subjects when they enter mainstream politics?  
At a broader level the case of the Chapare Coca growers draws 
attention to fact that while ‘democracy’ is a widely used term it’s meaning is 
not fixed. In concert with Julia Paley (2002) I argue that anthropologists need 
to examine the ways that democracy plays out at the local level, the kinds of 
meanings that get attached to the term, and the impact this has on notions of 
citizenship.  
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